Heidegger on Nietzsche and the Higher Freedom
Heidegger on Nietzsche and the Higher Freedom
This chapter considers the dependency of the thinker on history—which for Heidegger is the history of Being—and Heidegger’s referring to a realm of freedom that is also a realm of danger: danger belongs to the freedom of thinking. For Heidegger, genuine freedom exists only in the response to an address or challenge from somewhere beyond the individual’s will. This is inherent in the address of Being, in that Being must suffer oblivion that is “by no means the result of forgetfulness of thinking, but belongs to that essence of Being which it itself conceals.” Heidegger also acknowledges the power exerted by certain earlier thinkers within his own thinking, and Nietzsche is not least among these. In being addressed by Being through Nietzsche, Heidegger is exposed to the danger of uncovering only “the same” in Nietzsche and missing what was “once thought.”
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