I maintain that there is a justificatory structure to our arguments about art, with aesthetic qualities playing a central role. I use Frank Sibley’s famous article as an entry point for discussion, setting out his key claims that aesthetic qualities are not condition-governed, and that taste or perceptiveness is required for their ascription. It follows that the ascription of aesthetic qualities is always contestable, their attribution a site for dispute when it comes to appreciating art. After visiting the notion of supervenience, I examine some more elaborate taxonomies for aesthetic qualities proposed by Alan Goldman, and Noel Carroll as well as dissenting proposals from three other philosophers. This discussion results in an enlarged notion of aesthetic qualities and paves the way for the example of aesthetic disagreement I track in the following chapter: “It’s delicate.” “No, it’s insipid.” To conclude, I flesh out the contextualism inherent in my account by discussing the central claim from Kendall Walton’s seminal paper “Categories of Art”—that the aesthetic qualities a work of art possesses vary with the category to which it is assigned—as well as the notion of an artworld proposed by Arthur Danto and employed and elaborated by George Dickie.
Chicago Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.