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Measuring Judicial Independence – The Political Economy of Judging in Japan - Chicago Scholarship Online
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Measuring Judicial Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in Japan

J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen


The role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election raised questions in the minds of many Americans about the relationships between judges and political influence; the following years saw equally heated debates over the appropriate role of political ideology in selecting federal judges. Legal scholars have always debated these questions—asking, in effect, how much judicial systems operate on merit and principle and how much they are shaped by politics. The Japanese Constitution, like many others, requires that all judges be “independent in the exercise of thei ... More

Keywords: U.S. Supreme Court, 2000 presidential election, federal judges, United States, Japan, political ideology, econometric analysis

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2003 Print ISBN-13: 9780226703886
Published to Chicago Scholarship Online: March 2013 DOI:10.7208/chicago/9780226703879.001.0001


Affiliations are at time of print publication.

J. Mark Ramseyer, author

Eric B. Rasmusen, author