Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Bending the RulesProcedural Politicking in the Bureaucracy$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Rachel Augustine Potter

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780226621609

Published to Chicago Scholarship Online: January 2020

DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226621883.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM CHICAGO SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.chicago.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright University of Chicago Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in CHSO for personal use.date: 19 September 2021

Timing as a Tool

Timing as a Tool

(p.131) 6 Timing as a Tool
Bending the Rules

Rachel Augustine Potter

University of Chicago Press

Chapter 6 examines timing as a procedural politicking tool, specifically how it is employed at the final rule stage. The argument in this chapter is that agencies sometimes speed up the publication of a final rule (i.e. fast-track)—and other times slow it down (i.e. slow-roll)—so as to ensure that the rule is not released in a political environment that may lead it to be overturned. Additionally, this chapter considers—and ultimately rules out—alternate explanations for the observed patterns of regulatory pacing. Observers often bemoan the sluggish pace of rulemaking; this chapter offers a decidedly political explanation for regulatory delay.

Keywords:   timing, final rule, pacing, regulation, regulatory delay, procedural politicking, slow roll, fast track

Chicago Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.