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The Congressional Endgame – Interchamber Bargaining and Compromise | Chicago Scholarship Online
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The Congressional Endgame: Interchamber Bargaining and Compromise

Josh M. Ryan

Abstract

In bicameral legislatures like Congress, the two chambers must reach agreement before a bill is enacted into law, a process that is often chaotic and contentious. In The Congressional End Game: Interchamber Bargaining and Compromise in Congress, Josh Ryan offers a coherent theory of how this process works and the types of policy outcomes produced. He shows that both conference committees and an alternative resolution venue, amendment trading, create policy that approximates the preferences of the more moderate chamber, though neither chamber receives exactly what it wants. Using comprehensive ... More

Keywords: Congress, polarization, conference committees, party power, bicameralism

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780226582061
Published to Chicago Scholarship Online: May 2019 DOI:10.7208/chicago/9780226582375.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Josh M. Ryan, author
Utah State University