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The Congressional EndgameInterchamber Bargaining and Compromise$
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Josh M. Ryan

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780226582061

Published to Chicago Scholarship Online: May 2019

DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226582375.001.0001

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Conclusion: Postpassage Resolution and Legislative Outcomes

Conclusion: Postpassage Resolution and Legislative Outcomes

(p.180) Chapter Eight Conclusion: Postpassage Resolution and Legislative Outcomes
The Congressional Endgame

Josh M. Ryan

University of Chicago Press

The post-passage resolution process works surprisingly well. Legislation almost never fails, and consistent with the Framers' desires, there is strong evidence that most bills become more moderate after agreement through amendment trading or by a conference committee. These are important results because they suggest that even in an era of strong party polarization and low legislative productivity, the resolution process still successfully constrains the more extreme tendencies of chamber coalitions.

Keywords:   American political theory, post-passage resolution, bicameral bargaining, legislative productivity

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