A Bargaining Theory of Postpassage Resolution
A Bargaining Theory of Postpassage Resolution
In this chapter, a bargaining theory of post-passage resolution is developed. The theory claims that the chambers want to reach agreement, but that they dispute how much the new policy should reflect their preferred legislation. In short, both chambers have incentives to reach agreement, but they do not agree on what the compromise legislation should look like. Using the theory and insights from the congressional literature, empirical implications are drawn that make specific predictions about when conference committees will be used, when the conferees have discretion to change legislation, and how legislation will be changed at the post-passage resolution stage.
Keywords: bargaining theory, empirical implications, interchamber bargaining
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