Electoral Accountability, Party Loyalty, and Roll-Call Voting in the U.S. Senate
Electoral Accountability, Party Loyalty, and Roll-Call Voting in the U.S. Senate
This chapter examines the representational connection between roll-call behavior and electoral accountability in the context of Senate elections. More specifically, it examines the effects of both ideological extremity and party loyalty on senators' electoral fortunes in the context of all Senate elections from 1974 to 2004. From this, it hopes to offer new insights regarding the electoral effects of roll-call voting patterns in the Senate and present a comparative assessment of the differences between House and Senate elections. The chapter is organized as follows. It first reviews research on electoral accountability in the U.S. House before turning to a more general discussion of prior research on U.S. Senate elections. From there, it examines relevant theoretical issues underlying the analysis and then discusses the data and methodology employed here. Next, it presents results detailing the electoral consequences of ideological extremity and party loyalty in the U.S. Senate. It concludes by discussing the implications of the results and exploring possible avenues for future research.
Keywords: representation roll-call behavior, Senate elections, party loyalty, ideological extremity, senators
Chicago Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.
