This chapter discusses Gendun Chopel's text and the basic philosophy of Madhyamaka. One of the most important of the unique features of the Madhyamaka is: For the proponents of true existence, the very reasoning that negates existence proves nonexistence, and the very reasoning that negates nonexistence proves existence; their idea is that it must be the case that when the opponent's position is negated, one's own position is affirmed. But for the Prasangikas, not only are all positions of others refuted without exception, but also even one's own position is refuted by similar types of reasoning. When the nothingness in the state of meditative equipoise is connected with the appearances in subsequent attainment, this is the meaning of the unification of the nothingness of the state of equipoise and the appearance of something in subsequent attainment. The earlier Tibetans also asserted that the absence of intrinsic existence was the selflessness of persons, and freedom from the elaborations of the four extremes was the selflessness of phenomena.
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