Shifting Blame
Shifting Blame
This chapter questions the connection between corporate cooperation and corporate liability. This discussion is preceded by considering the fairness of trading corporate cooperation for government-granted favors when this cooperation implicates and scapegoats subordinate employees. Ever-increasing levels of corporate cooperation have become general proxies for organizational due diligence, in part because of the shift in regulatory orientation away from command and control strategies and, to be fair, in the absence of adhered-to liability rules. This proxy is unlike other aspects of compliance in that it is observable, easily quantified, easy to demand and barter for, and critically helpful to prosecutors in gaining leverage in investigations and negotiations with complex, multitiered firms where decision making is diffuse and evidence is otherwise difficult or impossible to obtain.
Keywords: corporate cooperation, corporate liability, government favors, due diligence, liability rules, decision making
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