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German Idealism as Constructivism$
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German Idealism as Constructivism

Tom Rockmore

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780226349909

Published to Chicago Scholarship Online: January 2017

DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226350073.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM CHICAGO SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.chicago.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright University of Chicago Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in CHSO for personal use.date: 26 June 2022

Hegel, Identity, and Constructivism

Hegel, Identity, and Constructivism

Chapter:
(p.92) Chapter 5 Hegel, Identity, and Constructivism
Source:
German Idealism as Constructivism
Author(s):

Tom Rockmore

Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:10.7208/chicago/9780226350073.003.0006

“Hegel, Identity and Constructivism,” the fifth chapter, examines the relationship of Hegel, beginning in the so-called Differenzschrift, his first philosophical publication, to Kant, Fichte and Schelling, his great idealist predecessors. I further discuss the emergence of Hegel’s constructivist theory of cognition in the Phenomenology as well as its application in his Philosophy of Nature. The chapter finally considers Hegel’s understanding of the link between dialectical logic and cognitive constructivism in both the smaller and greater Logics.

Keywords:   Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, identity, constructivism, Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Schelling, Phenomenology, Philosophy of Nature, Science of Logic

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