Fichte’s Transcendental Philosophy, the Subject, and Circularity
Fichte’s Transcendental Philosophy, the Subject, and Circularity
Chapter 3, “Fichte’s transcendental philosophy, the subject and circularity,” focuses on Fichte’s rethinking of the conception of the subject, and, as a result, ontology and cognition from a fully subject-centered perspective. The result is to remove the ambiguity in the critical philosophy about the status of the noumenon, or mind-independent real, which Kant inconsistently describes as uncognizable but as also indispensable for cognition. The chapter also treats the Fichtean link to the two-aspects thesis in his Deduction of representation. I show that Fichte states this representational approach to knowledge while denying its validity in a constructivist approach to cognition.
Keywords: Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Karl Leonhard Reinhold, representation, noumenon, critical philosophy
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