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Confronting Aristotle's EthicsAncient and Modern Morality$
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Eugene Garver

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780226283982

Published to Chicago Scholarship Online: March 2013

DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226284019.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM CHICAGO SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.chicago.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright University of Chicago Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in CHSO for personal use.date: 17 October 2019

What Aristotle's Rhetoric Can Tell Us about the Rationality of Virtue

What Aristotle's Rhetoric Can Tell Us about the Rationality of Virtue

Chapter:
(p.15) Chapter 1 What Aristotle's Rhetoric Can Tell Us about the Rationality of Virtue
Source:
Confronting Aristotle's Ethics
Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:10.7208/chicago/9780226284019.003.0002

This chapter exploits the comparison between rhetoric and virtue. The Rhetoric shows that the art of rhetoric aims at more than practical success because it is limited to rational persuasion. This limitation comes from developing an art of persuasion and not from some external moral considerations. The emergence of actions that are their own end out of actions initially chosen to achieve some end distinct from themselves is what is called the sociological dimension of practical rationality. Even in rhetoric, there are values not reducible to success, and so intimations of actions that are their own end. The Ethics finds in the virtues the same development of internal ends and actions chosen for their own sakes out of actions initially valued because of the external ends they achieve. For example, helping friends is a good. The virtue of liberality is a habit of choosing for its own sake to do what we can to help our friends. We choose to practice this virtue for its own sake. Where the external end is good, engaging in the internal end is noble. Aiming at the noble, we do not stop aiming at the useful. Virtuous actions have both internal and external ends, and the internal ends, such as engaging in the noble practice of helping friends financially, internalize the external and given end of our friends being helped. A comparison to the Rhetoric shows that ends become more rational as they become more practical, more within what the agent can do. Rationality and practicality grow together. The active life is the rational life.

Keywords:   rhetoric, virtue, persuasion, practical rationality, liberality, Ethics

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