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Economic Regulation and Its ReformWhat Have We Learned?$
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Nancy L. Rose

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780226138022

Published to Chicago Scholarship Online: January 2015

DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226138169.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM CHICAGO SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.chicago.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright University of Chicago Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in CHSO for personal use.date: 26 July 2021

Telecommunications RegulationCurrent Approaches with the End in Sight

Telecommunications RegulationCurrent Approaches with the End in Sight

Chapter:
(p.345) 6 Telecommunications RegulationCurrent Approaches with the End in Sight
Source:
Economic Regulation and Its Reform
Author(s):

Nancy L. Rose

Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:10.7208/chicago/9780226138169.003.0007

The regulatory restructuring of telecommunications markets, beginning with the breakup of AT&T in 1984 and extending to telecommunications markets worldwide, has transformed the telecommunications industry. The rise of cellular (“mobile”) telecommunications in recent years has achieved penetration rates over 80 percent in most industrialized countries, and for many consumers now replaces, rather than supplements, landline service. The spread of competing fiber networks operated by cable companies that offer voice service and broadband service in addition to pay TV has further transformed the competitive telecommunications environment in the US, and may do so in many other countries. This transition is greatly influenced by regulatory policy on mandatory unbundling of network elements, first adopted in the US in the mid-1990s and now used by regulators in most advanced economies. This chapter discusses central issues in deregulation of telephone service, including the prospect of competitive local markets. The chapter focuses on the role of facilities based competition in achieving that outcome. Regulatory impediments to facilities based competition are described, as are conditions under which a jurisdiction could end up with “regulation forever” by creating incentives for new entrants to choose a mandatory unbundling offer rather than investing in their own competing facilities.

Keywords:   telecommunication regulation, mandatory unbundling, economic regulation, deregulation, access pricing, facilities based competition

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