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The Idea of Hegel's "Science of Logic"$
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Stanley Rosen

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780226065885

Published to Chicago Scholarship Online: May 2014

DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226065915.001.0001

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(p.451) Twenty Objectivity
The Idea of Hegel's "Science of Logic"

Stanley Rosen

University of Chicago Press

In the Science of Logic, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel relates the transition from subjectivity to objectivity to the ontological proof for the existence of God. The traditional ontological argument neither views man as God nor equates human thought with the thinking of God, an assumption made by Hegel about the Science of Logic. This chapter examines Hegel’s logic on objectivity, particularly his assertion that the shift from the concept of God to his existence does not appear to be the same as that from the concept into objectivity, but that the logical process is indifferent to the content. It also discusses the Hegelian perspective about immediacy, the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, and mechanism and chemism.

Keywords:   logic, Science of Logic, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, subjectivity, objectivity, existence, God, immediacy, mechanism, chemism

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