Foundationalism and Antifoundationalism
Foundationalism and Antifoundationalism
This chapter examines Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s argument about foundationalism and antifoundationalism in his Science of Logic, especially his insistence that the former is equivalent to the external reflection by which essence is distinguished in non-dialectical logics from its appearances or properties. After offering some general remarks about the ground, the chapter discusses Hegel’s repudiation of the two standard philosophical procedures of attempting to explain the world from the outside: first by means of a transcendent first principle or foundation, and second from the inside. It also expounds on Hegel’s acceptance of the traditional Parmenidean claim that being and thinking are the same. Finally, the chapter looks at the structure of the ground from two perspectives: as origin or process and as demonstrated within its product.
Keywords: foundationalism, antifoundationalism, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, essence, ground, being, thinking, world, Science of Logic
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