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Philosophy of PseudoscienceReconsidering the Demarcation Problem$
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Massimo Pigliucci and Maarten Boudry

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780226051796

Published to Chicago Scholarship Online: January 2014

DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226051826.001.0001

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Pseudoscience and Idiosyncratic Theories of Rational Belief

Pseudoscience and Idiosyncratic Theories of Rational Belief

(p.417) 22 Pseudoscience and Idiosyncratic Theories of Rational Belief
Philosophy of Pseudoscience

Nicholas Shackel

University of Chicago Press

This chapter examines the relation of conviction to rational belief. It argues that the question of whether an inquiry is a pretense at science can be, in part, a question over the role of conviction in rational belief, and that the answer is to be found in the philosophical problem of the role of values in rational belief.

Keywords:   science, pseudoscience, conviction, rational belief, pretense

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