The Myth of Inexpressiveness
The Myth of Inexpressiveness
This chapter discusses the philosophical problem raised by ordinary language philosophy, which raises two questions. First, by what right do we base ourselves on what we ordinarily say? Second, on what, or on whom, do we base ourselves in order to determine what we ordinarily say? According to Cavell, however, these two questions are but one. This is a question of the relationship between me (my words) and the real (our world); for Cavell as for Wittgenstein, that is the question of our criteria. In discussing this, the chapter goes back to the examination of agreements in language. These agreements determine and are determined by criteria; we share criteria by means of which we regulate our application of concepts and through which we establish the conditions of conversation.
Keywords: ordinary language, cavell, wittgenstein, criteria, agreements, conversation
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