Ensuring Corporate Misconduct: How Liability Insurance Undermines Shareholder Litigation
Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith
Abstract
Shareholder litigation and class action suits play a key role in protecting investors and regulating big businesses. But Directors' and Officers' liability insurance shields corporations and their managers from the financial consequences of many illegal acts, as evidenced by the recent Enron scandal and many of last year's corporate financial meltdowns. This book demonstrates how corporations use insurance to avoid responsibility for corporate misconduct, dangerously undermining the impact of securities laws, arguing that this need not be the case. Opening up the formerly closed world of corpo ... More
Shareholder litigation and class action suits play a key role in protecting investors and regulating big businesses. But Directors' and Officers' liability insurance shields corporations and their managers from the financial consequences of many illegal acts, as evidenced by the recent Enron scandal and many of last year's corporate financial meltdowns. This book demonstrates how corporations use insurance to avoid responsibility for corporate misconduct, dangerously undermining the impact of securities laws, arguing that this need not be the case. Opening up the formerly closed world of corporate insurance, people from every part of the industry were interviewed in order to show the different instances where insurance companies could step in and play a constructive role in strengthening corporate governance—yet currently do not.
Keywords:
shareholder litigation,
class action,
Officers' liability insurance,
illegal acts,
Enron scandal,
corporate insurance
Bibliographic Information
Print publication date: 2011 |
Print ISBN-13: 9780226035154 |
Published to Chicago Scholarship Online: March 2013 |
DOI:10.7208/chicago/9780226035079.001.0001 |