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Ensuring Corporate MisconductHow Liability Insurance Undermines Shareholder Litigation$
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Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780226035154

Published to Chicago Scholarship Online: March 2013

DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226035079.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM CHICAGO SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.chicago.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright University of Chicago Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in CHSO for personal use.date: 07 March 2021



(p.1) Chapter One Introduction
Ensuring Corporate Misconduct
University of Chicago Press

This chapter discusses the theme of this book, which is the effectiveness of shareholder litigation in regulating corporate conduct. Based on interviews with people connected with Directors' and Officers' liability insurance, or D&O insurance, it examines the relationship between insurance and shareholder litigation and evaluates whether shareholder litigation accomplishes its regulatory objective. The chapter also discusses how the emerging consensus among most corporate and securities law scholars rejects compensation as a justification for shareholder litigation.

Keywords:   shareholder litigation, corporate conduct, D&O insurance, corporate law, securities law, compensation

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