Should We Torture in Ticking-Time-Bomb Cases?
Should We Torture in Ticking-Time-Bomb Cases?
This chapter contains a normative reply to the question: Is it morally permissible to torture in ticking-time-bomb cases? This question is trickier than it looks for the simple reason that there is a myriad of moral theories, and different theories may yield different answers. An ineffective strategy of amelioration in this regard would be to try to defend one moral theory against its rivals, both because that would take us too far afield and because such a defense would not be very convincing. No matter how well utilitarianism is defended by the author against deontologist friends—or vice versa—none of the parties ever seems swayed. Rather than staking the chances on those prospects, he proposes something else.
Keywords: moral theories, utilitarianism, deontologist, normative reply, ticking-time-bomb cases
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