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Partisan Motivations

Partisan Motivations

Chapter:
(p.69) Chapter Four Partisan Motivations
Source:
Congress in Reverse
Author(s):
Jordan M. RagusaNathaniel A. Birkhead
Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:10.7208/chicago/9780226717500.003.0004

This chapter tests whether repeals are the product of long-term competition between the parties over the majority’s achievements. Unlike the problem solving chapter, chapter four finds substantial evidence that repeals are driven by lawmakers’ partisan motivations. First, repeals are more likely to occur during unified government, when one party controls both chambers and the White House. Second, repeals tend to occur when a majority is “ascendant,” having seized control after a long period out of power. And third, repeals are most likely in eras of high party conflict when the majority is ideologically cohesive. Given these findings, the willingness of the party to dedicate scarce agenda space to undoing their rival’s signature laws—instead of advancing new legislation—indicates the importance of repeals in the minds of party leaders. Moreover, bills passed on a party-line vote are more likely to be targeted for repeal in the future. As a whole, there is clear and consistent evidence that repeals are driven by partisan motivations.

Keywords:   parties, agenda control, ideological cohesion, party competition

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