Page of

A Bargaining Theory of Postpassage Resolution

A Bargaining Theory of Postpassage Resolution

Chapter:
(p.40) Chapter Three A Bargaining Theory of Postpassage Resolution
Source:
The Congressional Endgame
Author(s):
Josh M. Ryan
Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:10.7208/chicago/9780226582375.003.0003

In this chapter, a bargaining theory of post-passage resolution is developed. The theory claims that the chambers want to reach agreement, but that they dispute how much the new policy should reflect their preferred legislation. In short, both chambers have incentives to reach agreement, but they do not agree on what the compromise legislation should look like. Using the theory and insights from the congressional literature, empirical implications are drawn that make specific predictions about when conference committees will be used, when the conferees have discretion to change legislation, and how legislation will be changed at the post-passage resolution stage.

Keywords:   bargaining theory, empirical implications, interchamber bargaining

Sign In

Copyright © 2021. All rights reserved.
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice