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Quantitative Evidence on Democratic Consolidation and International Organizations

Quantitative Evidence on Democratic Consolidation and International Organizations

Chapter:
(p.101) Chapter Five Quantitative Evidence on Democratic Consolidation and International Organizations
Source:
Organizing Democracy
Author(s):
Paul PoastJohannes Urpelainen
Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:10.7208/chicago/9780226543512.003.0005

This chapter continues the quantitative evaluation of our argument by subjecting to empirical evidence the claims that IOs can minimize the need for good fortune by performing mundane tasks that promote democratic consolidation and that IOs lack the coercive capacity necessary to stop autocratic reversals. The evidence shows that IO membership has a strong and positive influence on the prospects of democratic consolidation. But there are limits to what IOs can do for democratizing states. IO membership does nothing to deter authoritarian reversals in the absence of consolidation. Some things, such as preventing autocratic reversals, democratizing states must do for themselves. The chapter begins by offering several empirical implications and then proceeds to quantitatively test these implications. This entails developing a statistical method that accounts for both the self-selection of democratizing states into IOs and the unobservable nature of democratic consolidation.

Keywords:   split-population model, selection models, consolidate as unobservable

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