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Democracy, Political Particularism, and Trade Liberalization in Brazil

Democracy, Political Particularism, and Trade Liberalization in Brazil

Chapter:
(p.155) Six Democracy, Political Particularism, and Trade Liberalization in Brazil
Source:
Democracy and Trade Policy in Developing Countries
Author(s):
Bumba Mukherjee
Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:10.7208/chicago/9780226358956.003.0006

Does democratization promote trade liberalization when workers in a new democracy favor economic globalization? Does democratization weaken the political power of capital that favors trade protection? Are incumbents in candidate-centered democracies more receptive to free-trade? This chapter answers these questions by analyzing in-depth the politics of trade liberalization and lobbying by import-competing industries in Brazil from 1975-2008. A variety of evidence is gathered and analyzed for the Brazil case-study. This evidence includes historical analysis, statistical evaluation of trade barriers in Brazil, interviews of “industry-captains” and high-level government officials as well as political elites, and analysis of data on campaign contributions to politicians from domestic industries in Brazil. The Brazil case confirms the main theoretical predictions presented in chapters 2 and 4 of the book

Keywords:   Fernando Collor de Mello, campaign finance, workers’ union, median voter, import-competing industries

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