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Empirical Tests for Political Particularism, Trade Protection, and Contributions

Empirical Tests for Political Particularism, Trade Protection, and Contributions

Chapter:
(p.129) Five Empirical Tests for Political Particularism, Trade Protection, and Contributions
Source:
Democracy and Trade Policy in Developing Countries
Author(s):
Bumba Mukherjee
Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:10.7208/chicago/9780226358956.003.0005

The theoretical claims in the previous chapter about how political particularism influence trade barriers and lobbying from import competition by capital is statistically assessed in this chapter. Data gathered from established democracies across the developing world suggest that political particularism is influenced by a specific configuration of electoral institutions and that higher levels of political particularism in turn leads to reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers under certain labor market conditions. Exploratory data analysis of survey-response sample of firms in established developing country democracies indicates that lobbying for protection by import-competing industries is far more prevalent and successful in party-centered democracies than candidate-centered democracies. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the substantive and policy implications of the reported empirical results about the link between political particularism and trade policies.

Keywords:   political particularism, inter-industry labormobility, panel data, system-generalized methods of moment model

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