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Trade Protection and Electoral Fraud in New Democracies: The Empirical Evidence

Trade Protection and Electoral Fraud in New Democracies: The Empirical Evidence

Chapter:
(p.59) Three Trade Protection and Electoral Fraud in New Democracies: The Empirical Evidence
Source:
Democracy and Trade Policy in Developing Countries
Author(s):
Bumba Mukherjee
Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:10.7208/chicago/9780226358956.003.0003

This chapter evaluates the book’s main argument developed in chapter 2 which posits that political competition in new democracies leads to trade reforms when domestic labor market conditions ensure that workers in these states are receptive to globalization. Data on democratization and the occupational mobility of workers for more than 120 developing countries is gathered from 1972 to 2008 to evaluate this argument. Results from a variety of statistical models corroborate the key theoretical predictions about democratization and liberalization of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Assessment of some cross-national survey-response data shows that democratization discourages lobbying for trade protection by capital. Finally, detailed examination of data from 120 developing countries (1972-2008) reveals that trade reforms decreases the propensity for electoral fraud in newly democratized states.

Keywords:   statutory tariffs, democratization, pooled data, labor mobility, non-tariff barriers, electoral malpractice

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