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Merger Policy and Efficiencies

Merger Policy and Efficiencies

(p.39) 3 Merger Policy and Efficiencies
The Atlantic Divide in Antitrust
Daniel J. GiffordRobert T. Kudrle
University of Chicago Press

A state may be greatly affected by merger policies in other jurisdictions even if the firms involved have no production facilities in that state. Most major jurisdictions have responded by claiming a voice in the approval or rejection of mergers in other states. Despite past conflict, current treatment of unilateral effects and tacit collusion problems as well as efficiencies in horizontal mergers now appears quite similar in the U.S. and the EU as matters of declared policy. Each jurisdiction has horizontal merger guidelines that are strikingly similar. In the area of vertical and conglomerate mergers and on mergers involving potential competition, the extent of agreement is unclear. Only time will reveal whether this apparent transatlantic difference between the stated enforcement postures -- rather close convergence on horizontal mergers and much wider differences on non-horizontal mergers-- will actually lead to important differences in enforcement.

Keywords:   horizontal mergers, non-horizontal mergers, unilateral effects, tacit collusion, efficiencies, merger guidelines

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