This book offers a new interpretation of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Science of Logic in order to elucidate the problem that underlies Hegel’s critique of traditional rationalism. It examines issues such as Hegelian dialectical ontology and its relation to the broader theoretical doctrines of post-Tractarian analytical philosophy, or whether modern science is itself dialectical. It analyzes Hegel’s dialectico-speculative logic and his rejection of formalism, along with his attitude towards metaphilosophy in the context of philosophy. It discusses three main problems, central to the history of Western philosophy, which Hegel claims to solve without resorting to traditional or nondialectical thinking: the problem of analysis, the problem of reference, and whether there is a logic that is appropriate to the conceptualization of the unity of the process of life. These three problems can be reformulated into one general problem: how to overcome the nihilism resulting from Eleatic monism on one hand, and of Platonic-Aristotelian dualism on the other.
Keywords: logic, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science of Logic, rationalism, dialectical ontology, analytical philosophy, metaphilosophy, nihilism, monism, dualism