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Economic inequality in the United States has followed a distinct U-shaped pattern since the end of WWII - a dramatic decline until the 1970s followed by a steady increase that puts current levels of inequality as high or higher than they've been in measured history. This book argues that connections between economic and political power help to explain these patterns. When domestic and global economic conditions generate higher levels of inequality, this concentration of income also produces a concentration of political power that further benefits the rich. Using various analytical approaches and a variety of data sources, the book demonstrates that as inequality rises: Republican candidates perform better in elections, public opinion fails to become more supportive of redistribution, the status quo bias inherent in the U.S. policy making process induces more inequality, and when policy agreement does occur it is more likely to generate inegalitarian policy changes. All of these patterns point to a self-reinforcing pattern in which inequality reshapes American politics (both political behavior and political institutions) in ways that further reinforce inequality in the U.S. political economy.

The World Bank and other multilateral development banks (MDBs) carry out their mission to alleviate poverty and promote economic growth based on the advice of professional economists. But as is argued in this book, these organizations have also been indelibly shaped by Washington politics, particularly by the legislative branch and its power of the purse. Tracing American influence on MDBs over three decades, this volume assesses increased congressional activism and the perpetual “selling”; of banks to Congress by the executive branch. The author contends that congressional reluctance to fund the MDBs has enhanced the influence of the United States on them by making credible America's threat to abandon the banks if its policy preferences are not followed. At a time when the United States' role in world affairs is being closely scrutinized, this book will be necessary reading for anyone interested in how American politics helps determine the fate of developing countries.

The current tax system is unfair. Some of the richest people in America pay no tax, while a huge share of the tax burden falls on the rest of us. A mere glance at the tax code confirms that it is far too complex, with volumes of rules that no ordinary person could possibly comprehend. Some conservatives have called for a so-called flat tax. But a flat tax is not necessarily a simple tax, and “flat” means “more” for most taxpayers: a rise in middle-class taxes to finance tax cuts for the rich. Is there another choice? This book proposes a straightforward and fair alternative. A “fair not flat” tax that is consistent and progressive would tax spending, not income and savings. And if it were collected at its lower levels through a national sales tax, most people would not have to file a return. A supplemental tax on spending for the wealthiest individuals would make the national sales tax progressive. Under this system, a family of four would pay no tax on their first $20,000 in spending, and 15 percent on the next $60,000. Only the few families who spend more than $80,000 a year would be subject to the supplemental tax. Necessities would be taxed less than ordinary and luxury items. No one would be taxed directly on savings. The estate and gift or so-called death tax would be abolished, for the simple reason that dead people don't spend. The “fair not flat” tax would fall on heirs when they spend their good fortune.

With global demand for energy poised to increase by more than half in the next three decades, the supply of safe, reliable, and reasonably priced gas and oil will continue to be of fundamental importance to modern economies. Central to this supply are the pipelines that transport this energy. And while the fundamental economics of the major pipeline networks are the same, the differences in their ownership, commercial development, and operation can provide insight into the workings of market institutions in various nations. Drawing on a century of the world's experience with gas and oil pipelines, this book illustrates the importance of economics in explaining the evolution of pipeline politics in various countries. It demonstrates that institutional differences influence ownership and regulation, while rents and consumer pricing depend on the size and diversity of existing markets, the depth of regulatory institutions, and the historical structure of the pipeline businesses themselves. The history of pipelines is also rife with social conflict, and the author explains how and when institutions in a variety of countries have controlled pipeline behaviour—either through economic regulation or government ownership—in the public interest.

With accumulating evidence casting doubt on forecasts of imminent decline in welfare states, some recent scholarship has instead focused on a different scenario: the prospects for cross-national “convergence.” Predictions that welfare states are becoming more similar over time, perhaps even converging on a common model of public provision, have long been present in the welfare state literature. This prediction, for example, was implicit in the logic of industrialism's focus on developmental processes that were assumed to operate similarly within industrial capitalism. This chapter examines whether welfare states have become more similar in the contemporary historical era, factors that generate convergence pressures, and factors that promote dissimilarity and divergence. It focuses on the historical period from 1980 through 2001 and uses the more limited social security transfers measure for the earlier period from 1960 through 1980. The chapter first considers various perspectives on welfare state convergence, including the new modernization thesis and the emergence of the European Union.