- Title Pages
- Introduction: 1968
- 1 The Setting
- 2 Preliminary Empirics: Methodology and Communist Judges
- 3 The Effect of Judicial Decisions: Anti-Government Opinions and Electoral Law Disputes
- 4 Political Disputes: Military, Malapportionment, Injunctions, and Constitutional Law
- 5 Administrative Disputes: Taxpayers against the Government
- 6 Criminal Cases: Suspects against the Government
- 7 Toward a Party-Alternation Theory of Comparative Judicial Independence
- 8 Conclusions
- Appendix A Excerpts from the Constitutional Texts
- Appendix B Data Used For <i>Time2sok</i> Estimates in Table 2.5–2.7
- Appendix C Interpreting Ordered Probit Results In Tables 3.3 and 3.4
- Appendix D A Formal Model of Prosecutorial Incentives
- Measuring Judicial Independence
- University of Chicago Press
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