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Prudential SupervisionWhat Works and What Doesn't$
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Frederic S. Mishkin

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780226531885

Published to Chicago Scholarship Online: February 2013

DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226531939.001.0001

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Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline?

Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline?

The Case of Argentina, 1992–99

Chapter:
(p.147) 5. Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline?
Source:
Prudential Supervision
Author(s):

Charles W. Calomiris

Andrew Powell

Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:10.7208/chicago/9780226531939.003.0005

In recent years, Argentina has undertaken a sweeping reform of its system of prudential supervision, particularly in the aftermath of the tequila crisis in 1994, by using greater reliance on market discipline to promote a safe and sound banking system. This chapter outlines what changes Argentina has made in its supervisory system and assesses how well these changes have worked to create credible market discipline of the banking system. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 summarizes the experiences with privatization, foreign entry, consolidation, bank failure, and depositor loss. Section 5.3 focuses on differences in bank deposit interest rate risk premiums and in deposit growth, with an emphasis on the degree of diversity within the system with respect to these measures of market discipline. It then develops a framework for identifying links between fundamentals that affect bank default risk and market reactions to that risk (as seen through higher interest rates on deposits and lower deposit growth). Finally, it considers evidence on the effectiveness of market discipline in constraining bank risk taking. Section 5.4 concludes. A commentary and discussion summary are also included at the end of the chapter.

Keywords:   banking reform, prudential supervision, bank regulation, tequila crisis, banking system, market discipline, bank deposit interest rates, bank default risk, risk management

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