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Breeding Bio InsecurityHow U.S. Biodefense Is Exporting Fear, Globalizing Risk, and Making Us All Less Secure$
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Lynn C. Klotz and Edward J. Sylvester

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780226444055

Published to Chicago Scholarship Online: February 2013

DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226444079.001.0001

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Who's Minding the Store?

Who's Minding the Store?

Chapter:
(p.133) Chapter Seven Who's Minding the Store?
Source:
Breeding Bio Insecurity
Author(s):

Lynn C. Klotz

Edward J. Sylvester

Publisher:
University of Chicago Press
DOI:10.7208/chicago/9780226444079.003.0007

Usually everybody trusts the research institutions' legally mandated institutional biosafety committees (IBCs) to safeguard neighborhoods from harm at the local level by providing expert oversight under the aegis of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 and the Select Agent Rules mandate a series of oversight procedures that seem reasonable for those handling the eighty or so agents on the list. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) offers a false sense of security, applying only to dual-use research and virtually ignoring other dangerous experiments, and leaving all responsibility in the hands of researchers and IBCs. Finally, even if a government committee could provide adequate oversight compliance with guidelines or regulations, this applies only within the United States. Hence, no one country can be safe unless oversight protections apply internationally.

Keywords:   institutional biosafety committees, IBCs, National Institutes of Health, NIH, National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, NSABB, dual-use research, safe, compliance

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