The confidence-building measures by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) included information on defensive programs, high-biocontainment laboratories, vaccine manufacturing plants, and infectious disease outbreaks. A major detractors' argument is that bioweapons agents can be destroyed in a short time, unlike hundreds of drums of chemicals agents. So, it is asserted that the BWC is unverifiable even with the added protocol, and no parallel can be drawn with verification under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Global support is a must for the strongest interpretations of both the BWC and the CWC and it becomes necessary to embrace the biosecurity trinity. If thinking globally does not lead to acting globally, a future as dangerous as the paranoia has conjured might be faced on a global level.
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