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Aristotle's Dialogue with SocratesOn the "Nicomachean Ethics"$

Ronna Burger

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780226080505

Published to Chicago Scholarship Online: March 2013

DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226080543.001.0001

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(p.218) Appendix 1 Socrates, Plato, Philosophy in the Nicomachean Ethics

(p.218) Appendix 1 Socrates, Plato, Philosophy in the Nicomachean Ethics

Aristotle's Dialogue with Socrates
University of Chicago Press

Plato (I.4.1095a32–34): For Plato was well perplexed and sought whether the path is from the principles or to the principles, as in the race course from the judges to the finish line or back again.

Philosophy (I.6.1096a11–17): Perhaps it is better to examine the universal and be thoroughly perplexed about how it is spoken of, yet such an inquiry becomes troublesome on account of being friends with the men who introduced the forms. But perhaps it might be thought better, and necessary for saving the truth to give up the things of one's own, in other ways too but especially being philosophers; for while both are dear, it is holy to honor the truth in preference.

Philosophy (I.6.1096b30–31): But perhaps these matters [the ways in which things are called good] should be dismissed for now; for to be precise about them would be more akin to another philosophy.

Philosophy (I.8.1098b16–18): So it would be beautifully said [that happiness lies in actions and activities of the soul], being in accordance with this old opinion and agreed on by those philosophizing.

Plato (II.3.1104b11–13): Hence one ought be habituated somehow directly from youth, as Plato says, so as to enjoy and be pained in the things in which one ought; for this is correct education.

Philosophy (II.4.1105b12–15): But the many do not do these things [become habituated by practice], but taking refuge in logos they believe they philosophize and will in this way be serious, like invalids who listen carefully to physicians but do nothing to follow the things prescribed.

Philosophy (II.4.1105b16–18): Just as those will not be in a good condition of the body, being taken care of in that way, neither will these in regard to the soul philosophizing in this way.

(p.219) Socrates (III.8.1116b3–5): And experience about particulars is thought to be courage; whence Socrates believed courage is epistēmē.

Socrates (IV.7.1127b22–26): The ironic, speaking in understatement, appear to be more charming in character, for they seem not to speak for the sake of profit, but avoiding the pompous, they mostly disown things held in esteem, as Socrates used to do.

Socrates (VI.13.1144b17–21): Hence some say all the virtues are forms of phronēsis, and Socrates in one way sought correctly, in another he erred; for in believing that all the virtues are forms of phronēsis he erred, but that they are not without phronēsis, he spoke beautifully.

Socrates (VI.13.1144b28–30): Socrates believed, then, that the virtues are logoi, for they are all epistēmai, whereas we believe they are together with logos.

Socrates (VII.2.1145b23–24): For it would be terrible, as Socrates believed, with epistēmē being within, for something else to rule and drag it around like a slave.

Socrates (VI.2.1145b25–27): For Socrates used to fight against the logos completely, as if there were no such thing as akrasia; for no one acts against what he supposes best except through ignorance.

Socrates (VII.3.1147b13–17): And since the last term is not the universal or thought to be scientific knowledge like the universal, what Socrates sought seems to follow; for it is not when what is thought to be knowledge in the sovereign sense is present that the pathos comes to be, nor that [knowledge] that is dragged around because of the pathos, but the sensible.

Philosophy (VII.11.1152b1–2): To theorize about pleasure and pain belongs to one philosophizing in the political manner.

Philosophy (IX.1.1164b2–6): It seems to be in this manner also for those who have shared in philosophy; for the worth is not measured by money, and honor would not come to be equally matched, but perhaps it is sufficient, as in relation to gods and parents, [to pay back] what is possible.

Philosophy (IX.12.1172a1–6): Whatever it is for each to be and for the sake ofwhich they choose to live, in this they want to spend their time with friends; hence some drink together, some play dice together, others practice gymnastics together and hunt together or philosophize together, everyone spending the days together in that which most of all they cherish in life.

(p.220) Plato (X.2.1172b28–32): By such an argument Plato denies that pleasure is the good; for the pleasant life is more choiceworthy together with phronēsis than apart from it, but if the mixed is superior, pleasure is not the good; for the good does not become more choiceworthy with anything added to it.

Philosophy (X.7.1177a22–27): We believe that pleasure ought to be mixed in with happiness, but the most pleasant of activities in accordance with virtue is agreed to be that in accordance with sophia; at least philosophy seems to have pleasures wondrous in purity and firmness, and it is reasonable that the pastime be more pleasant for those who know than for those who seek.

Philosophy (X.9.1181b12–15): The issue of legislation being left undiscovered by our predecessors, perhaps it would be better for us to examine it, and generally about the regime, in order that as far as possible human philosophy might be completed.