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Why We Need Ordinary Language Philosophy$
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Sandra Laugier

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780226470542

Published to Chicago Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226037554.001.0001

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The Ordinary as Heritage

The Ordinary as Heritage

Natural and Conventional

(p.75) Chapter Seven The Ordinary as Heritage
Why We Need Ordinary Language Philosophy

Sandra Laugier

Daniela Ginsburg

University of Chicago Press

This chapter discusses Austin's radical rejection of a certain form of phenomenology. When Austin speaks of “linguistic phenomenology,” he is thinking less of what the philosophy of language should or could be than of what phenomenology should be—the description of what is there, at our disposal, and the differences this makes. What is given, and is all that we have, is our common language, our ordinary utterances. This is the point of Austin's arguments against the idea of primitive or “incorrigible” statements, or statements of “pure experience.” The objection is not that there is always some theory or some language within experience, rather, the objection is that if there are “primary” statements, or in any case statements that we do not doubt, these are not statements of experience or perception or even of observation, but ordinary statements.

Keywords:   phenomenology, austin, philosophy of language, incorrigible statements, pure experience

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